Карьера после ухода из Правительства РФ: некоторые характеристики
Научная статья
Для цитирования
Тев Д. Б. Карьера после ухода из Правительства РФ: некоторые характеристики // Власть и элиты. 2024. Том 6. № 1. С. 98-138. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31119/pe.2019.6.1.6 EDN: BRITCP
Аннотация
Анализируется постправительственная карьера членов правительства России. Эмпирической основой исследования послужила база данных, включающая биографические анкеты 221 члена постсоветских (действовавших с ноября 1991 г.) правительств России, которые по состоянию на август 2017 г. хотя бы однажды выбыли из высшего органа исполнительной власти. Были выявлены основные институциональные каналы, в рамках которых проходит постправительственная карьера. Важнейшим местом работы членов правительства сразу после ухода с должности являются административные структуры. Большинство бывших деятелей правительства работали в коммерческих организациях, но переходы в бизнес носят в основном косвенный характер. Менее значимым каналом постправительственной карьеры служат представительные органы (прежде всего Государственная Дума), а также учреждения образования и науки. В целом большинство членов правительства после отставки в то или иное время занимали такие позиции, которые позволяют отнести их к элитам разного уровня (федеральной, региональной и пр.) и функциональной специализации (административной, экономической, политической и пр.), что говорит об определенной устойчивости членства в элите. Особенности постправительственной карьеры обсуждаются в связи с характеристиками экономического и политического устройства России («кумовской капитализм», слабость парламента и пр.).
Ключевые слова:
правительство, постправительственная карьера, элита, бизнес, администрация, парламент
Литература
1. Гладышева А.А., Кишилова Ю.О. Влияние политических связей и государственной собственности на деятельность фирм в России // Journal of Corporate Finance Research / Корпоративные финансы. 2018. Т. 12, № 1. С. 20–43.
2. Зазнаев О.И. Полупрезидентская система: политико-правовой анализ: автореф. дис. … д-ра юрид. наук, Казань, 2006.
3. Зазнаев О.И. Индексный анализ полупрезидентских государств Европы и постсоветского пространства // Политические исследования. 2007. № 2. С. 146–164.
4. Тев Д.Б. Высокопоставленные региональные администраторы: особенности карьеры после ухода с должности // Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии. 2015. Т. XVIII, № 4 (81). С. 37–52.
5. Тев Д.Б. (a) Федеральная административная элита России: образовательные характеристики // Мир России. 2016. Т. 25, № 3. С. 76–96.
6. Тев Д.Б. (b) Экономическая элита РФ: опыт работы в политико-административной сфере // Полития. 2016. № 2 (81). С. 89–108.
7. Тев Д.Б. Депутаты Государственной Думы РФ: особенности карьеры после прекращения полномочий // Социологическое обозрение. 2018. Т. 17, № 1. С. 106–133.
8. Тев Д.Б. Члены правительства РФ: особенности постправительственной карьеры // Мир России. 2019. Т. 28, № 4. С. 6–29.
9. Baturo A., Arlow J. Is there a ‘revolving door’ to the private sector in Irish politics? // Irish Political Studies. 2018. № 33 (3). P. 381–406.
10. Baturo A., Mikhaylov S. Blair disease? Business careers of the former democratic heads of state and government // Public Choice. 2016. № 166 (3–4). P. 335–354.
11. Bennett A.J. The American President’s Cabinet: from Kennedy to Bush. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996. 263 р.
12. Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Schoar A., Thesmar D. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle: Evidence from France / Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, March 15, 2007. URL: http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pageperso/kramarz/politics_060207_v4.pdf (дата обращения: 16.04.2017).
13. Blondel J. The Post-Ministerial Careers // The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe /ed. by Blondel J., Thiebault J.-L. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. P. 153–173.
14. Boubakri N., Cosset J.-C., Saffar W. The Impact of Political Connections on Firms’ Operating Performance and Financing Decisions // Journal of Financial Research. 2012. № 35 (3). P. 397–423.
15. Boubakri N., Guedhami O., Mishra D., Saffar W. Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital // Scientific Literature Digital Library. 2008. № 10. URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.6368&rep=rep1&type=pdf (дата обращения: 16.04.2017).
16. Carretta A., Farina V., Gon A., Parisi A. Politicians “on board”! Do political connections affect banking activities in Italy? // European Management Review. 2012. № 9 (2). P. 75–83.
17. Claessen C., Bailer S. What happens after? An analysis of post-parliamentary private sector career positions in Germany and the Netherlands. Paper prepared for the workshop „Institutional Determinants of Legislative Coalition Management”, 16–19 November 2015, Tel Aviv University, Israel. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/research/projects/evolution-parliamentarism/events/seminars/claessenbailerwhathappensafter.pdf (дата обращения: 17.08.2018).
18. Claveria S., Verge T. Post-ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition, individual resources and institutional opportunity structures // European Journal of Political Research. 2015. № 54 (4). P. 819–835.
19. Cohen J.E. The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC // American Journal of Political Science. 1986. № 30 (4). P. 689–708.Costa Pinto A., Cotta M., Tavares de Almeida P. Beyond Party Government? Technocratic Trends in Society and in the Executive // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida/ London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 1–27.
20. Costa Pinto A., Tavares de Almeida P. The Primacy of Experts? Non-partisan Ministers in Portuguese Democracy // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida/ London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 111–137.
21. De Winter L. Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet // The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe / ed. by J. Blondel, J.-L. Thiebault / Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. P. 44–69.
22. Diermeier D., Keane M., Merlo A. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers // American Economic Review. 2005. № 95 (1). P. 347–373.
23. Dombrovsky V. Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia. Stockholm School of Economics in Riga. Research paper № 3. 07.2008. URL: http://www.biceps.org/assets/docs/izpetes-raksti/ResearchPaperNo3 (дата обращения: 14.03.2017).
24. Dörrenbächer N. Patterns of post-cabinet careers: When one door closes another door opens? // Acta Politica. 2016. № 51 (4). P. 472–491.
25. Dowding K., Dumont P. (eds.) The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing, London: Routledge, 2009. 235 р.
26. Faccio M. Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis // Financial Management. 2010. № 39 (3). P. 905–928.
27. Faccio M., Masulis R.W, Mcconnell J.J. Political connections and corporate bailouts // Journal of Finance. 2006. № 61 (6). P. 2597–2635.
28. Fan J.P.H., Wong T.J., Zhang T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and the Post-IPO Performance of China’s Partially Privatized Firms // Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 2014. № 26 (3). P. 85–95.
29. Fish M.S., Kroenig M. The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 800 р.
30. Freitag P.J. The Cabinet and Big Business: A Study of Interlocks // Social Problems. 1975. № 23 (2). P. 137–152.
31. Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? // Review of Financial Studies. 2009. № 22 (6). P. 2331–2360.
32. Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts // Review of Finance. 2013. № 17 (5). P. 1617–1648.
33. Herrick R., Nixon D.L. Is There Life after Congress? Patterns and Determinants of Post-Congressional Careers // Legislative Studies Quarterly. 1996. № 21 (4). P. 489–499.
34. Hillman A.L. Politicians on the Board of Directors: Do Connections Affect the Bottom Line? // Journal of Management. 2005. № 31 (3). P. 464–481.
35. Hoffmann-Lange U. Theory-Based Typologies of Political Elites // The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites / ed. by H. Best, J. Higley. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. P. 53–68.
36. Huskey E. (a). Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2010. № 43 (4). P. 363–372.
37. Huskey E. (b). Pantouflage à la russe: The Recruitment of Russian Political and Business Elites // Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin / ed. by S. Fortescue. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. P. 185–204.
38. Kang J.-K., Zhang L. From Backroom to Boardroom: Role of Government Directors in U.S. Public Firms and Their Impact on Performance, 2015. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2115367 (дата обращения: 19.08.2016).
39. Keane J. Life after Political Death: The Fate of Leaders after Leaving High Office // Dispersed Democratic Leadership Origins, Dynamics, and Implications / ed. by J. Kane, H. Patapan, P. Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 279–298.
40. Kim J.-H. Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment // Economics of Governance. 2013. № 14 (2). P. 107–126.
41. Kryshtanovskaya O., White S. Losing Power in Russia // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 2005. №. 21 (2). P. 200–222
42. Luechinger S., Moser C. The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market. CESifo Working Paper No. 3921, 2012. URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_ Papers/wp-cesifo–2012/wp-cesifo-2012-08/cesifo1_wp3921.pdf (дата обращения: 07.12.2016).
43. Nicholls K. The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members // Western Political Quarterly. 1991. № 44 (1). P. 149–172.
44. Niessen A., Ruenzi S. Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany // German Economic Review. 2010. № 11 (4). P. 441–464. Parker G.R., Parker S.L., Dabros M.S. The Labor Market for Politicians: Why Ex-Legislators Gravitate to Lobbying // Business & Society. 2013. Vol. 52. № 3. P. 427–450.
45. Prewitt K., Nowlin W. Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians // Western Political Quarterly. 1969. № 22 (2). P. 298–308.
46. Saeed M.A. Do Political Connections Matter? Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in Pakistan. PhD Thesis. London: Middlesex University, 2013. URL: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/12361/1/MASaeed%20thesis.pdf (дата обращения: 06.01.2017).
47. Samuels D. Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 248 р.
48. Santos F.G.M., Pegurier F.J.H. Political Careers in Brazil: Long-term Trends and Cross-sectional Variation // Regional & Federal Studies. 2011. № 21 (2). P. 165–183.
49. Semenova E. Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in an Executive-Dominated System: Post-Soviet Russia 1991–2009 // Comparative Sociology. 2011. № 10 (6). P. 908–927.
50. Semenova E. Russia: cabinet formation and careers in a superpresidential system // The Selection of Ministers around the World / ed. by K. Dowding, P. Dumont. London; New York: Routledge, 2015. P. 139–155.
51. Semenova E. Recruitment and Careers of Ministers in Central Eastern Europe and Baltic Countries // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida. London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 173–202.
52. Shevchenko I. Easy Come, Easy Go: Ministerial Turnover in Russia, 1990–2004 // Europe-Asia Studies. 2005. № 57 (3). P. 399–428.
53. Stolz K., Fischer J. Post-Cabinet Careers of Regional Ministers in Germany, 1990–2011 // German Politics. 2014. № 23 (3). P. 157–173.
54. Stolz K., Kintz M. Post-Cabinet Careers in Britain and the US: Theory, Concepts and Empirical Illustrations. Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014 Glasgow, September 3–6, 2014. URL: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/8127572d9f46-4c11-8238-2b6ca8e2e14a.pdf (дата обращения: 07.12.2014).
55. Theakston K. Life after Political Death: Former Leaders in Western Democracies // Representation. 2012. № 48 (2). P. 139–149.
56. Theakston K., Vries J. de. Introduction // Former Leaders in Modern Democracies: Political Sunsets / ed. by K. Theakston, J. Vries de. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P. 1–11.
2. Зазнаев О.И. Полупрезидентская система: политико-правовой анализ: автореф. дис. … д-ра юрид. наук, Казань, 2006.
3. Зазнаев О.И. Индексный анализ полупрезидентских государств Европы и постсоветского пространства // Политические исследования. 2007. № 2. С. 146–164.
4. Тев Д.Б. Высокопоставленные региональные администраторы: особенности карьеры после ухода с должности // Журнал социологии и социальной антропологии. 2015. Т. XVIII, № 4 (81). С. 37–52.
5. Тев Д.Б. (a) Федеральная административная элита России: образовательные характеристики // Мир России. 2016. Т. 25, № 3. С. 76–96.
6. Тев Д.Б. (b) Экономическая элита РФ: опыт работы в политико-административной сфере // Полития. 2016. № 2 (81). С. 89–108.
7. Тев Д.Б. Депутаты Государственной Думы РФ: особенности карьеры после прекращения полномочий // Социологическое обозрение. 2018. Т. 17, № 1. С. 106–133.
8. Тев Д.Б. Члены правительства РФ: особенности постправительственной карьеры // Мир России. 2019. Т. 28, № 4. С. 6–29.
9. Baturo A., Arlow J. Is there a ‘revolving door’ to the private sector in Irish politics? // Irish Political Studies. 2018. № 33 (3). P. 381–406.
10. Baturo A., Mikhaylov S. Blair disease? Business careers of the former democratic heads of state and government // Public Choice. 2016. № 166 (3–4). P. 335–354.
11. Bennett A.J. The American President’s Cabinet: from Kennedy to Bush. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996. 263 р.
12. Bertrand M., Kramarz F., Schoar A., Thesmar D. Politicians, Firms and the Political Business Cycle: Evidence from France / Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, March 15, 2007. URL: http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pageperso/kramarz/politics_060207_v4.pdf (дата обращения: 16.04.2017).
13. Blondel J. The Post-Ministerial Careers // The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe /ed. by Blondel J., Thiebault J.-L. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. P. 153–173.
14. Boubakri N., Cosset J.-C., Saffar W. The Impact of Political Connections on Firms’ Operating Performance and Financing Decisions // Journal of Financial Research. 2012. № 35 (3). P. 397–423.
15. Boubakri N., Guedhami O., Mishra D., Saffar W. Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital // Scientific Literature Digital Library. 2008. № 10. URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.6368&rep=rep1&type=pdf (дата обращения: 16.04.2017).
16. Carretta A., Farina V., Gon A., Parisi A. Politicians “on board”! Do political connections affect banking activities in Italy? // European Management Review. 2012. № 9 (2). P. 75–83.
17. Claessen C., Bailer S. What happens after? An analysis of post-parliamentary private sector career positions in Germany and the Netherlands. Paper prepared for the workshop „Institutional Determinants of Legislative Coalition Management”, 16–19 November 2015, Tel Aviv University, Israel. URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/research/projects/evolution-parliamentarism/events/seminars/claessenbailerwhathappensafter.pdf (дата обращения: 17.08.2018).
18. Claveria S., Verge T. Post-ministerial occupation in advanced industrial democracies: Ambition, individual resources and institutional opportunity structures // European Journal of Political Research. 2015. № 54 (4). P. 819–835.
19. Cohen J.E. The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC // American Journal of Political Science. 1986. № 30 (4). P. 689–708.Costa Pinto A., Cotta M., Tavares de Almeida P. Beyond Party Government? Technocratic Trends in Society and in the Executive // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida/ London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 1–27.
20. Costa Pinto A., Tavares de Almeida P. The Primacy of Experts? Non-partisan Ministers in Portuguese Democracy // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida/ London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 111–137.
21. De Winter L. Parliamentary and Party Pathways to the Cabinet // The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe / ed. by J. Blondel, J.-L. Thiebault / Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. P. 44–69.
22. Diermeier D., Keane M., Merlo A. A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers // American Economic Review. 2005. № 95 (1). P. 347–373.
23. Dombrovsky V. Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia. Stockholm School of Economics in Riga. Research paper № 3. 07.2008. URL: http://www.biceps.org/assets/docs/izpetes-raksti/ResearchPaperNo3 (дата обращения: 14.03.2017).
24. Dörrenbächer N. Patterns of post-cabinet careers: When one door closes another door opens? // Acta Politica. 2016. № 51 (4). P. 472–491.
25. Dowding K., Dumont P. (eds.) The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing, London: Routledge, 2009. 235 р.
26. Faccio M. Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis // Financial Management. 2010. № 39 (3). P. 905–928.
27. Faccio M., Masulis R.W, Mcconnell J.J. Political connections and corporate bailouts // Journal of Finance. 2006. № 61 (6). P. 2597–2635.
28. Fan J.P.H., Wong T.J., Zhang T. Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and the Post-IPO Performance of China’s Partially Privatized Firms // Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 2014. № 26 (3). P. 85–95.
29. Fish M.S., Kroenig M. The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 800 р.
30. Freitag P.J. The Cabinet and Big Business: A Study of Interlocks // Social Problems. 1975. № 23 (2). P. 137–152.
31. Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? // Review of Financial Studies. 2009. № 22 (6). P. 2331–2360.
32. Goldman E., Rocholl J., So J. Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts // Review of Finance. 2013. № 17 (5). P. 1617–1648.
33. Herrick R., Nixon D.L. Is There Life after Congress? Patterns and Determinants of Post-Congressional Careers // Legislative Studies Quarterly. 1996. № 21 (4). P. 489–499.
34. Hillman A.L. Politicians on the Board of Directors: Do Connections Affect the Bottom Line? // Journal of Management. 2005. № 31 (3). P. 464–481.
35. Hoffmann-Lange U. Theory-Based Typologies of Political Elites // The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites / ed. by H. Best, J. Higley. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. P. 53–68.
36. Huskey E. (a). Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2010. № 43 (4). P. 363–372.
37. Huskey E. (b). Pantouflage à la russe: The Recruitment of Russian Political and Business Elites // Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin / ed. by S. Fortescue. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. P. 185–204.
38. Kang J.-K., Zhang L. From Backroom to Boardroom: Role of Government Directors in U.S. Public Firms and Their Impact on Performance, 2015. URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2115367 (дата обращения: 19.08.2016).
39. Keane J. Life after Political Death: The Fate of Leaders after Leaving High Office // Dispersed Democratic Leadership Origins, Dynamics, and Implications / ed. by J. Kane, H. Patapan, P. Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. P. 279–298.
40. Kim J.-H. Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment // Economics of Governance. 2013. № 14 (2). P. 107–126.
41. Kryshtanovskaya O., White S. Losing Power in Russia // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 2005. №. 21 (2). P. 200–222
42. Luechinger S., Moser C. The Value of the Revolving Door: Political Appointees and the Stock Market. CESifo Working Paper No. 3921, 2012. URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_ Papers/wp-cesifo–2012/wp-cesifo-2012-08/cesifo1_wp3921.pdf (дата обращения: 07.12.2016).
43. Nicholls K. The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theory and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members // Western Political Quarterly. 1991. № 44 (1). P. 149–172.
44. Niessen A., Ruenzi S. Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany // German Economic Review. 2010. № 11 (4). P. 441–464. Parker G.R., Parker S.L., Dabros M.S. The Labor Market for Politicians: Why Ex-Legislators Gravitate to Lobbying // Business & Society. 2013. Vol. 52. № 3. P. 427–450.
45. Prewitt K., Nowlin W. Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians // Western Political Quarterly. 1969. № 22 (2). P. 298–308.
46. Saeed M.A. Do Political Connections Matter? Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in Pakistan. PhD Thesis. London: Middlesex University, 2013. URL: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/12361/1/MASaeed%20thesis.pdf (дата обращения: 06.01.2017).
47. Samuels D. Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 248 р.
48. Santos F.G.M., Pegurier F.J.H. Political Careers in Brazil: Long-term Trends and Cross-sectional Variation // Regional & Federal Studies. 2011. № 21 (2). P. 165–183.
49. Semenova E. Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in an Executive-Dominated System: Post-Soviet Russia 1991–2009 // Comparative Sociology. 2011. № 10 (6). P. 908–927.
50. Semenova E. Russia: cabinet formation and careers in a superpresidential system // The Selection of Ministers around the World / ed. by K. Dowding, P. Dumont. London; New York: Routledge, 2015. P. 139–155.
51. Semenova E. Recruitment and Careers of Ministers in Central Eastern Europe and Baltic Countries // Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies / ed. by A. Costa Pinto, M. Cotta, P. Tavares de Almeida. London: Palgrave, 2017. P. 173–202.
52. Shevchenko I. Easy Come, Easy Go: Ministerial Turnover in Russia, 1990–2004 // Europe-Asia Studies. 2005. № 57 (3). P. 399–428.
53. Stolz K., Fischer J. Post-Cabinet Careers of Regional Ministers in Germany, 1990–2011 // German Politics. 2014. № 23 (3). P. 157–173.
54. Stolz K., Kintz M. Post-Cabinet Careers in Britain and the US: Theory, Concepts and Empirical Illustrations. Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014 Glasgow, September 3–6, 2014. URL: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/8127572d9f46-4c11-8238-2b6ca8e2e14a.pdf (дата обращения: 07.12.2014).
55. Theakston K. Life after Political Death: Former Leaders in Western Democracies // Representation. 2012. № 48 (2). P. 139–149.
56. Theakston K., Vries J. de. Introduction // Former Leaders in Modern Democracies: Political Sunsets / ed. by K. Theakston, J. Vries de. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P. 1–11.
Статья
Поступила: 07.05.2019
Опубликована: 20.08.2019
Форматы цитирования
Другие форматы цитирования:
ACM
[1]
Тев, Д.Б. 2024. Карьера после ухода из Правительства РФ: некоторые характеристики. Власть и элиты. 6, 1 (ноя. 2024), 98-138. DOI:https://doi.org/10.31119/pe.2019.6.1.6.
Раздел
Карьерные пути российской элиты
